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Preface 
Competitive allocation of research funding is a major mechanism within the science 
system. It is fundamentally based on the idea of peer review. In fact, the process 
depends on two different peer review processes: first the selection of papers by journals, 
which leads to reputation, and second peer review of grant proposals, which is partly 
based on the reputation and of applicants. Peer review is central in project selection as 
peers are considered to be in a unique position to identify and select the best and most 
innovative researchers and research projects. So far the theory, but what can be said 
about practice?  
In this study, we assess the practice of peer-review based project selection. The basic 
question is “do the best researchers get the funding”? In other words, do peer review 
based quality indicators predict success in receiving funding? The next question to be 
answered is about the peer review. Do peer reviewers indeed recognize the best 
researchers, and subsequently, is the decision of the research council based on the 
outcomes of peer review? Finally, we answer the question whether other factors 
influence the probability of receiving funding, such as the role of co-applicants, the 
effects of gender, and the effect of the discipline of the application. 
Studying the processes and outcomes of project selection and grant allocation may help 
to improve the functioning of the research system. We aim to replicate this study in more 
cases (research fields) and extend it to other aspects of project allocation and funding 
systems. 
This study was conducted in collaboration with the Netherlands Social Science 
Research council (MaGW/NWO). Without the support of the board and staff of MaGW, 
this research project would not have been possible. We hope that this study, as well as 
possible follow-up projects, will contribute to the improvement of research budget 
allocation and of research policy in general. 
 
Peter van den Besselaar  
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1 Introduction  
Creative researchers are the sources of new ideas. Researchers translate ideas into 
project proposals, and try to get their projects funded. Research councils develop 
operating procedures to select the best and most innovative research proposals. In this 
report we address the question of whether or not this process of variation (by the 
researchers) and selection (by the research councils) is working in this way. In other 
words, are research councils selecting the best proposals of the best researchers for 
funding? The council for social scientific research (MaGW) of the Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) kindly provided us with access to their 
materials for investigating this question in their case. 
MaGW/NWO is the research council for the social and behavioral sciences in the 
Netherlands. It covers all social and behavioral disciplines, including law and economics. 
It distributes research funds over researchers, institutes and infrastructures, and 
increasingly plays a leading role in agenda setting, coordination and network formation 
in its domain. MaGW has a budget of about 36 M€/year, of which is 8 M€ for the open 
competition, 10 M€ for career grants, and 13 M€ for thematic research grants. In this 
case study we assess the outcome of the open competition for research funding as well 
as the career grants, which constitute about half of the councils’ budget. 
A significant amount of research has been done to investigate how peer review systems 
function, for example, in the context of journals selecting papers for publishing and in the 
context of grant allocation. Researchers have found that reviewers are not consistent in 
their assessments of proposals and papers (e.g., Rothwell & Martyn 2000) and some 
have observed a rather strong gender bias and nepotism (Wenneras & Wold), although 
this has not been found in more recent periods (Sandstrom & Halsten 2005). A recent 
meta-analysis confirms the existence of a gender bias, but it does not seem very strong 
(Bornmann et al, forthcoming).  
Peer review comes in a variety of formats, and what is called peer review regularly is 
actually committee review, in which strategic behavior prevails. One of the issues is that 
committees do no necessarily always select the best amongst their peers, but reach a 
compromise, allowing each committee member to have his/her favorite proposal funded 
(Langfeldt 2004).   
Another issue is the assessment of interdisciplinary research and research proposals. 
Research indicates that the assessment of interdisciplinary work is rather problematic, 
and that this type of work systematically gets low grades (Laudel et al 2006).  
This criticism of peer review has resulted in proposals to use bibliometric quality 
indicators as a more objective alternative. However, this has also been criticized, mainly 
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because in some fields bibliometric indicators are not applicable, and because existing 
bibliographic databases are incomplete and biased, for instance, towards English 
language publications. Additionally, citing patterns are different between different (sub) 
disciplines; therefore, bibliometrics indicators are difficult to compare between research 
fields.  
Criticisms concerning peer review have resulted in a variety of proposals to change 
procedures (Frolich 2003; British Academy 2007); however, some studies do suggest 
that peer review works well (Wessely 1998; ESF 2006). 
 
This report is organized as follows.  
- In chapter 2 the two models used in this study are introduced. Chapter 3 defines the 
concepts, describes the data and methods used, and ends with the research questions.  
- Chapter 4 focuses on the question of whether past performance is related to success in 
grant applications.  
- After having done this, chapter 5 extends the analysis taking into account the referee 
scores (section 5.1), the discipline to which a proposal belongs (section 5.2), the funding 
instruments (section 5.3), gender of the applicant (section 5.4), the institutional affiliation 
of the applicants (section 5.5) and the influence of the co-applicants (section 5.6). 
Finally, section 5.7 briefly discusses past performance of social and behavioral 
researchers who publish in scholarly journals but have not applied for a research grant, 
and compares this with the past performance of the applicants.  
- The report ends with the conclusions and with a discussion of the implications and 
open issues (chapter 6).  
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2 The model 
This study’s basic question will be answered in terms of the relationship between the 
past performance of researchers and the allocation decision of a research council: is 
research money distributed among the best researchers? Figure 1 shows the basic 
model, in which we consider the research council’s procedure as a black box. We are 
interested in the relation between the input and the output.  
 
 
FIGURE 1: Basic model 
 
 
The main issue is to define past performance. In this study we use the number of 
publications and number of citations received by the applicant to measure his or her past 
performance, as well as the quality of the co-applicant(s). Initially, the focus was on past 
performance in terms of the number of publications produced by an applicant in the two 
years preceding the application, plus the year of application, but it turned out that in 
some cases the number of citations during the same period was the better predictor 
(despite this short citation window). 
Since this is a case study about a social science research council, the Social Science 
Citation Index (SocSCI) is used as a comprehensive data source, even though this has 
been disputed within the social sciences (SWR/RGW 2005).  A few issues are relevant 
to our study. First, in several subfields of the social sciences, books and not journals are 
the main publication format. We do not take these other publication formats into account, 
and for several fields (such as law) this may be a serious disadvantage. For those fields, 
the current analysis should be interpreted with even more care (Nederhof 2006). 
Second, the journals indexed in the SocSCI do not cover the total relevant journal space, 
and the coverage of the SocSCI is different for different parts of the social sciences. 
Elsewhere we have shown that the orientation on SocSCI processed journals differs per 
subfield (Van den Besselaar 2007). Third, even if sub-fields of the social sciences are 
equally well covered by the SocSCI, they are not homogenous in terms of publication 
patterns and citation patterns.  
 
Increasingly, Dutch universities are operationalizing quality in terms of citations and 
publications in ISI-indexed journals, for example, in the evaluation of graduate schools. 
Although many researchers have doubts about the validity of the (Soc)SCI’s counting of 
Past 
performance 
Funding 
received 
Council 
procedure 
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publications and citations as an indicator for scientific quality, the funding and evaluation 
procedures increasingly take into account this type of indicator; therefore researchers 
themselves try to get into the ‘top journals’ as defined by the SocSCI’s impact factor 
(Leydesdorff, Jasist, in press).  
After the test of our basic model, we will extend it to a few other factors. Here, we will not 
discuss the theoretical background in depth, but only describe it briefly. Figure 2 shows 
the extended model.  
 
 
FIGURE 2: Extended model 
 
 
The extended model is based on a combination of a Mertonian and a constructivist 
perspective on peer review (Bornmann 2007). The constructivist perspective adds that 
the social structure has to be reproduced by agency and that choices have to be made. 
Decisions made about the funding of research, for example, are based on the quality of 
the researcher involved (1), the proposal (2), and the network of the applicant (3). The 
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quality of the proposal is defined by the judgments of peers, which are based on a 
review process. In this judgment, the overall quality of the applicant (4) and his/her 
network (5) may play a role.1 One should not easily assume that the Mertonian norms of 
science (Merton, 1942) will prevail in the selection process (Wenneras & Wold, 1997). 
By adding a ‘social constructivist’ perspective to the Mertonian scheme, one can also 
take into account certain interests and social factors. In this study, we include three 
variables that reflect these factors. We will also test whether gender, discipline and 
university affiliation differences are related to the decisions of the research council (6), 
and to the referees’ judgments (7). 
Of course, the past performance of the researcher and his/her network can also 
influence the quality of the proposal; thus reviewers may also take into account past 
performance, rather than just the quality of the specific application under review. In this 
study we restrict ourselves to the relationship between past performance and the 
decision made about the application (arrow 1); the effect of the reviewers’ assessments 
(arrow 2), and the quality of the applicant’s network (arrow 3).  
We also do some tests about the effects of past performance (arrow 4) and the 
applicants’ network (arrow 5) on the review. We also focus on the following question: 
how do contextual factors play a role? This question is important, because it may teach 
us something about the quality of the procedures: are they biased in one way or 
another? The relationship between the ‘mertonian variables’ and the outcome of the 
decision tend to reflect little bias and convey more about the effectiveness of the 
selection process. To measure the latter more directly would require the inclusion of 
post-performance. However, for the dataset under analysis here (applications to the 
research council in 2003, 2004 and 2005), this is too early. 
                                                 
1 However, in case of the young researchers program, not so much past performance but expected 
future performance may be an importance consideration.  
Rathenau Instituut – Department of Science System Assessment 
 
12
 
3 Data and methods  
In this study the independent variable is the decision about the proposal:  
? ‘fundable’ and funded applications (A) 
? ‘fundable’ but not funded applications (A-) 
? ‘non-fundable’ applications (B)2  
Groups of researchers: Since researchers do not submit an application every year, three 
different groups are distinguished in parts of this analysis: 
? Successful applicants  
? Unsuccessful applicants  
? Non-applicants3  
Disciplines and years: Citation behavior and orientation on SSCI journals differ per 
subfield; thus it may be useful to distinguish between subfields. In this report, we start at 
the aggregate level of the social and behavioral sciences as a whole, and cover the 
three years for which we were provided with data: 2003, 2004, and 2005. After that we 
check whether the results would be different if the analysis was done for the years 
separately, and for subfields separately.  
Instruments: The research council uses a variety of funding instruments, and the data 
distinguish between personal grants for researchers in different phases of their careers, 
the ‘vernieuwingsimpuls’ (VI) and the open competition (OC).4 The role of past 
performance differs per instrument, so there is also a need for distinguishing between 
instruments. Specifically, the personal grants for starting researchers (the VENI awards) 
may not be based on past performance, since these researchers are probably too young 
to have a strong track record. As a result, we also analyzed the data for the four 
instruments separately.  
Past performance: We define the quality of the applicant in terms of past performance. 
And we operationalize past performance in a specific way. For each of the years, the 
time horizon for past performance is three years. In other words, success in 2003 is 
                                                 
2 If we group A- and A together, in stead of A- an B, the results of the analysis do not change in a 
meaningful way. 
3 If an allocation mechanism would attract the best researchers, the non-applicants are expected to 
score lower on the quality criteria than the applicants. 
4 The thematic programs of the research council cannot be included in this analysis. It would be useful 
to analyze these too, as the goals of the thematic programs are different – and include criteria such as 
the possible societal outcomes of the research.   
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related to performance data from 2001 to 2003, success in 2004 to performance data 
from 2002 to 2004, and success in 2005 to performance data from 2003 to 2005.  
The “times cited” are measured on Feb. 9, 2007. All papers (articles, reviews, and letters 
in the three year periods) with a Dutch address are included. The applications to MaGW 
are the units of analysis; in the case of non-applicants the author names are used. In 
other words, when a single researcher applies more than once in one year, s/he may 
score differently on the grants received, but not on the quality indicators. If a researcher 
applies in different years, past performance is different between the years, as 
publications and citations for the same applicant may differ between the periods (e.g., 
2001-2003; 2002-2004; 2003-2005). 
The last name and the first initial were used for matching the ISI data and the application 
data. This generates a bit of error. For example, one of Leydesdorff’s articles is listed in 
the ISI-database as authored by “T. Leydesdorff”, and Van den Besselaar also appears 
as “Van den BesselaarA” in the database. These errors were not (manually) corrected. 
Our results should therefore be read as statistics with margins of error.  
Quality of the network: In this study we define the quality of the applicants’ network as 
the quality if the co-applicants. The past performance of the co-applicants is 
operationalized in the same way as past performance of the applicants - that is using 
publications and citations. More specifically, we use two different operationalizations to 
obtain indicators for the quality of the network:  
? Average network quality 
o average number of publications by the applicant and co-applicants 
o average number of citations received by the applicant and co-applicants 
? Maximal network quality 
o number of publications of the most publishing of the applicant and the co-
applicants  
o number of citations received by the most cited of the applicant and the co-
applicants 
Of course, this has two implications. First, only open competition applications can be 
included in the analysis, as the other three programs do not require co-applicants. And 
second, other dimensions of an applicants’ network are neglected, such as the status of 
the applicants’ PhD supervisor, the co-author network of the applicant, and the like. This 
is an interesting topic for further research.  
Quality of the proposal: The database includes the referee’s judgments. However, 
different instruments have a different classification system, which also changes over the 
years. Three of the four scales are a five-point scale, the other a three-point scale. We 
translated these into one five-point scale, as shown in table 1.  
Methods: four methods will be used in the analysis:  
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? Correlation analysis: the relation between the independent variables (past 
performance, quality of the application, quality of the network, referee’s 
judgment) and the dependent variable (the awarded grants)? 
? Analysis of variance: are successful applicants different from the non-successful 
in terms of the independent variables? 
? Discriminant analysis: can we ‘predict’ which application will be successful, 
based on the independent variables. 
? Visual inspection of the distributions, in order to better interpret the statistical 
analysis.  
Using correlation analysis, we relate past performance of the applicant and the review 
score of the application (the independent variables) with the amount of money received. 
Using Anova, we compare the group of successful applications with the group of 
unsuccessful applications: do they differ in terms of the independent variables. Using 
Discriminant Analysis, we test if the independent variables can be used to ‘predict’ 
whether an application is successful or not. In the latter two analyses, the amount of 
money received is not taken into account. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Coding of the referees’ scores 
Coding OC OC / VI VI* 
1  A Excellent Continue 
2   Very Good Doubt/continue 
3  B Good Doubt 
4   Fair Doubt/stop 
5  C Poor Stop 
OC: open competition 
VI:  ‘vernieuwingsimpuls’ 
* used in the preselection phase  
 
 
Research questions: We will answer the following questions in this report: 
1. Are the A (funded), A- (fundable, unfunded) and B (unfunded) applicants different 
in terms of past performance?  
2. Does past performance (of all the three groups) correlate with funding received? 
3. Can we predict the success of applicants from their past performance? 
Then we turn to the elaborated model, and include the referees’ judgments: 
4. Are the A (funded), A- (fundable, unfunded) and B (unfunded) applicants different 
in terms of number of  
5. Can we predict the success of applicants based on their numbers of publications, 
citations, and referee scores (and in case of the open competition: the quality of 
the co-applicants)?  
After answering these central questions, we then analyze the influence of some 
mediating variables, such as different subfields, funding instruments, and gender. More 
specifically, we will discuss the following four issues: 
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6. Are there differences between disciplines: are the results different in e.g., law, 
economics, psychology and other disciplines under study here? Does the 
discipline influence the relations between the performance variables and the 
probability of success?  
7. Are there differences between the instruments: the ‘open competition’ and the 
three ‘career development programs’ (Veni, Vidi, Vici)? 
8. And what about gender differences? 
9. Differences between universities? is the university affiliation of the main applicant 
related to the probability of success? 
10. Have patterns changed over the years? 
11. What about those who did not apply? Do the successful applicants (A) differ from 
the unsuccessful (A- and B) applicants and from the non-applicants? 
 
 
TABLE 2: Variables in this study 
Pub Number of publications by the applicant (three years before the application) 
Cit Number of citations to these publications at 7 Feb. 2007 
Pub2 Average number of publications by applicant and the co-applicants  
Cit3 Average number of citations to the publications of the applicant and the co-applicants, at 7 
Feb. 2007 
Pub3 Number of publications by the most productive of the applicant and the co-applicants  
Cit3 Number of citations to the publications of the most cited of the applicant and the co-applicants, 
at 7 Feb. 2007 
Sex Gender  of  main applicant 
Uni University of main applicant 
Disc Discipline of application 
Instr funding instruments (three types of personal grants and open competition) 
Ref Average of the referee’s reports 
Dec ‘Fundability’: assessment by research council  
euro ‘Funding’: grants received from the research council in (euro). 
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4 The basic model 
4.1 Past performance and budget allocation  
ANOVA can be used to test whether recipients score higher in terms of output and 
citations than researchers who did not get their proposal accepted. Table 3 gives the 
results. The two groups score differently in terms of the average numbers of publications 
and received citations. The successful applicants publish more than the failed applicants 
(4.45 versus 2.71 publications) and are cited more (36 versus 15 citations). All 
differences are statistically significant. Finally, the referees are significantly more positive 
about the funded applications. The difference is one point in a five point scale. The 
successful applications score 1.6 (‘very good/excellent’) and the non-funded applications 
score on average 2.7 (slightly better than ‘good’) 
 
 
TABLE 3: Publications and citations by success (2003-2005) 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum 
Maximu
m 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Citations A 275 36.03 70.704 4.264 27.64 44.43 0 593 
  A- / B 911 15.61 45.295 1.501 12.67 18.56 0 621 
  Total 1186 20.35 52.969 1.538 17.33 23.36 0 621 
Publications A 275 4.45 5.988 .361 3.74 5.16 0 43 
  A- / B 911 2.71 4.915 .163 2.39 3.03 0 62 
 Total 1186 3.11 5.233 .152 2.81 3.41 0 62 
 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Citations Between Groups 88091.424 1 88091.424 32.224 .000 
  Within Groups 3236713.147 1184 2733.710     
  Total 3324804.571 1185      
Publications Between Groups 638.992 1 638.992 23.785 .000 
  Within Groups 31808.317 1184 26.865     
  Total 1332.180 1177      
A: funded ; A-:fundable, not funded; B: not-fundable 
 
What changes if we group the applications in different way: the ‘fundable applications’ (A 
and A-) versus the ‘non-fundable applications’ (B)? Again, the ‘fundable’ applications 
score significantly better in all variables than the ‘non-fundable’ ones. The differences 
are statistically significant but at the same time smaller than in the comparison of the 
funded (A) and the non-funded (A- and B) applications. Indeed, comparing A with A-, 
again the A’s score significantly higher than the A-‘s applications.5  
Most statistical techniques used in this study are meant for data with normal 
distributions, although Discriminant Analysis is said to be robust against violation of the 
                                                 
5 Table 3.1 and 3.2 in the appendix give the details. 
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assumptions. Because the data used have a rather skewed distribution, we also analyze 
the data visually. This helps to interpret the statistical results correctly. Let us first 
present graphs of the distribution of publications and of citations. 
Both figures show the funded applications on the left side and the rejected ones on the 
right side. The thin (in color: red) line represents the citations and the thick (blue) line the 
publication of the applicant. Clearly, the distributions of both variables are skewed – as 
expected. Figure 3 suggests that the distribution of the number publications per 
applicant is not very different between the two groups. Figure 4 suggests the same for 
the distribution of the citations. In any case, if there are differences, they are not large. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Distribution of publications; successful applicants (left) and unsuccessful (right)  
(left axis: number of publications and of citations/100) 
 
To obtain a more detailed overview, we also plot the distribution of publications of the 
275 successful applicants and the top performing 275 non-successful applicants in one 
graph (figure 5).6 The same was done for the citations (figure 6).  The results are 
interesting: the best of the unsuccessful applicants actually score higher in terms of past 
performance than the successful applicants do. In other words, the long tail of applicants 
with low past performance causes the differences in the averages between the groups. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the skewed distribution of the data indeed influences 
the statistical results. 
                                                 
6 Based on citations received and (secondly) on publications. 
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FIGURE 4: Distribution of citations; successful applicants (left) and unsuccessful (right) 
(left axis: number of publications and of citations/100) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Distribution of publications of successful and best unsuccessful applicants  
(left axis: number of publications and of citations/100) 
 
 
Restricting the ANOVA to the top 275 unsuccessful applicants and the 275 successful 
one’s radically changes the result. As already suggested by figures 5 and 6, 
unsuccessful applicants score significantly better in both past performance indicators. 
The distribution over the four instruments (OC, Veni, Vidi, Vici) is not equal in both 
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groups.7 Correcting for this – by using a stratified sample of the best unsuccessful 
applicants – does not change this result. Table 4 shows the results of the ANOVA for the 
stratified sample of the top unsuccessful applicants. 
FIGURE 6: 
Distribution of citations of successful and best unsuccessful applicants 
(left axis: number of publications and of citations/100) 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: Publications and citations by success (2003-2005) 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Min Max 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
pub A 275 4.44 5.992 .361 3.73 5.15 0 43 
  A-/B* 277 6.92 7.068 .425 6.08 7.75 0 62 
  Total 552 5.68 6.664 .284 5.13 6.24 0 62 
cit A 275 36.03 70.708 4.264 27.63 44.42 0 593 
  A-/B* 277 48.04 72.338 4.346 39.48 56.59 0 621 
  Total 552 42.05 71.718 3.053 36.06 48.05 0 621 
 
  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
pub Between Groups 846.670 1 846.670 19.711 .000 
  Within Groups 23624.850 550 42.954     
  Total 24471.520 551      
cit Between Groups 19907.016 1 19907.016 3.891 .049 
  Within Groups 2814158.461 550 5116.652     
  Total 2834065.476 551      
A: funded ; A-:fundable, not funded; B: not-fundable 
*: stratified (by funding instrument) sample of best scoring unsuccessful applicants 
 
 
With these results, question 1 can be answered. On average: 
? the funded applicants have a better past performance than the non-funded;  
                                                 
7  The distribution in the successful group:  OC=154; Veni=65; Vidi=43; Vici=12.  
 The distribution in the unsuccessful top: OC=159; Veni=83; Vidi=21; Vici=12. 
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? the fundable applicants have a better past performance than the non-fundable; 
? the funded applicants have a better past performance than the fundable-non-
funded; 
? however, the ‘best’ non-funded applicants have a significantly better past 
performance than the funded applicants. This suggests firstly that selection is not 
strongly based on past performance (as defined in this study), and secondly that 
the reservoir of potential recipients is much larger than the group that was funded 
(Melin and Danell 2006).8 
 
 
4.2 Can we predict success from past performance? 
We will now analyze the relationship between past performance and success in getting 
an application funded. In table 5, we give the correlation between the independent 
variables and the amount of funds received from the research council. The application is 
again the unit of analysis. Consequently, if researchers file more than one project, these 
projects are treated as two different cases.  
 
 
TABLE 5.  Success by past performance 
 Cit euro 
Publications Pearson Correlation .818(**) .159(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 1186 1186
Citations Pearson Correlation  .197(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N  1178
 
 
As table 5 shows, past performance measures – numbers of citations received and 
number of publications – correlate strongly. They correlate also with the amount of 
funding received, but this correlation is low. Because the data used are relatively skewed 
(publications, citations), an ordinal measure of association such as spearman’s rho is 
preferred.9 The same pattern emerges as in the case of the Pearson’s correlation, but 
the correlations are stronger (table 6).  
 
 
                                                 
8 A recent evaluation of the ‘VI programs’ of the research councils Geosciences and Life Sciences 
(Aard- en Levenswetenschappen,), Chemical Sciences & Advanced Chemical Technologies for 
Sustainability), and Physical Sciences (Exacte Wetenschappen) shows similar results (Van Leeuwen 
2007). Using a different indicator for past performance, Van Leeuwen shows that in most cases 
average past performance of the awarded researchers is higher than the non-awarded one’s. 
However, he did not compare between the successful applicants with the best non-successful ones. 
Our hypothesis would be that the relations found for these research councils disappear if the analysis 
would be done for the best applicants only.  
9 The referees’ judgments are less skewed, and the mean (2.42) and median (2.17) only differ slightly.  
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TABLE 6. Success by past performance 
  cit euro 
Publications Spearman’s rho  .923(**) .160(**)
   Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 1186 1186
 Citations Spearman’s rho  .185(**)
   Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
   N  1178
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Can one predict success using the independent variables? Again, for this we use a 
Discriminant Analysis (DA). DA may be used specifically to predict group membership (a 
nominal variable) from interval variables, such as (here) the numbers of publications and 
citations.  
Firstly, we conduct a DA, using only the number of publications and citations received by 
the applicant. Table 7 shows the results. Based on past performance, about one third of 
the funded projects are classified correctly, and about 85% of the rejected applications. 
Actually, running the stepwise procedure, about the same result occurs. But the DA only 
includes the received citations only (table 8). All the discriminant analyses de result in a 
significant model. 
 
 
TABLE 7: Success of applications by pub en cit 
 
A versus  
A-/B  
Predicted Group  
Membership Total 
    A A- or B   
Original Count A 99 176 275
    A- or B 151 760 911
  % A 36.0 64.0 100.0
    A- or B 16.6 83.4 100.0
72.4% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
A = funded; A- = fundable, not funded; B = not fundable 
 
 
TABLE 8: Success of applications by pub en cit (stepwise*) 
 
A versus 
A-/B  
Predicted Group  
Membership Total 
    A A- or B  
Original Count A 96 179 275
    A- or  B 142 769 911
  % A 34.9 65.1 100.0
    A- or B 15.6 84.4 100.0
72.9% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
* Stepwise: cit in the analysis 
 
In summary, successful and unsuccessful applications differ in terms of the numbers of 
publications by the applicants, but these differences do not differentiate between the two 
classes. The model correctly classifies some 35% of successful applications, and some 
85% of the unsuccessful. This does not change in the stepwise model. In other words, 
on this level of all instruments and all sub-disciplines, the past performance (as defined 
in this specific way) is only weakly related to success.  
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TABLE 9. Success by past performance* 
  Cit euro 
Pub Spearman's rho  .833(**) -.256(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 552 552
Cit Spearman's rho   -.262(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000
  N  552
*    Stratified (by funding instrument) sample of best scoring unsuccessful applicants 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
As in section 4, the long tail associated with the unsuccessful group may strongly 
influence the outcome of the analysis.  We therefore repeated the analysis including only 
the top of the unsuccessful applicants (stratified sample in terms of funding instruments). 
The results are striking: the correlation between past performance and funding gets 
negative, and the correlations are stronger than in case of the whole sample (table 9).  
The Discriminant Analysis works slightly different than it does in the case of the whole 
sample.  A larger number of the successful applications is correctly classified now. 
However, the number of correctly classified unsuccessful application has decreased 
(table 10).  
 
 
TABLE 10. Classification of applications from pub en cit (stepwise*) 
  decision Predicted Group Membership Total 
    A A- or B   
Original Count A 192 83 275
    A- or B 148 129 277
  % A 69.8 30.2 100.0
    A- of B 53.4 46.6 100.0
a  58.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
A = funded; A- = fundable, not funded; B = not funded 
 
 
We can now answer the second and the third question: Do past performance and 
success correlate? Can we predict the success of applicants from their publications and 
citations?  
- The correlation analysis shows only a low correlation between the scientometric 
indicators of past performance, and the amount of money received.  
- If we want to predict success and failure (and do not take into account the amount of 
money received), the number of citations can be used to predict group membership. 
However, only a low percentage of the successful cases are correctly classified.  
- Finally, within the group of successful and top 275 unsuccessful applicants, the 
relationship is completely opposite: we find a negative correlation between past 
performance and the amount of funding received, and between referee judgment and 
funding. 
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5 The extended model 
5.1 Referee scores and success 
Now we extend the model, especially with the scores of the reviewers. ANOVA can be 
used to test whether the recipients score higher in terms of referee judgments than the 
researchers that did not get their proposal accepted (table 11)? The referees were 
significantly more positive about the funded applications. The difference is one point in a 
five point scale. The funded applications score 1.6 (‘very good/excellent’) and the non-
funded applications score on average 2.7 (slightly better than ‘good’). 
What changes if we group the applications in different way: the ‘fundable applications’ (A 
and A-) versus the ‘non-fundable applications’ (B)? Again, the ‘fundable’ applications 
score significantly better in all variables than the ‘non-fundable’ ones. The differences 
are statistically significant but at the same time smaller than in the comparison of the 
funded (A) and the non-funded (A- and B) applications. Indeed, comparing A with A-, 
again the A’s score significantly higher than the A-‘s applications.  
 
 
TABLE 11: Referee results by success (2003-2005) 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Referee  A 274 1.5929 0.6343 .03645 1.5211 1.6647 1.00 3.67 
Judgment A-/ B 904 2.6770 1.04475 .03475 2.6088 2.7452 1.00 5.00 
  Total 1183 2.4249 1.06388 .03100 2.3640 2.4857 1.00 5.00 
 
  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Referee  Between Groups 247.143 1 247.143 267.862 .000 
  Within Groups 1085.037 1176 .923    
  Total 1332.180 1177     
A: funded ; A-:fundable, not funded; B: not-fundable 
 
 
We now proceed with the correlation between referees’ scores and success in getting an 
application funded. Table 12 shows the correlation between the independent variables 
and the amount of funds received from the research council.  Again, the application is 
the unit of analysis, so if researchers did successfully get more than one project funded, 
these projects are treated as two different cases.  
The referees’ judgments correlate low but significantly with the past performance 
indicators. It also correlates moderately with the funding received, but higher than the 
past performance indicators do. Please note that the negative sign in this case is 
actually pointing to a positive correlation. The scale used for measuring the referee’s 
judgment uses 1 for ‘very good’ and 5 for ‘poor’.  
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TABLE 12 Success by past performance and peer review 
 Cit Referee  euro 
Publications Pearson Correlation .818(**) -.173(**) .159(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
  N 1186 1178 1186
Citations Pearson Correlation  -.179(**) .197(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000
  N  1178 1186
Referee  Pearson Correlation   -.326(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)   .000
  N   1178
 
 
Also here the ordinal measure of association (spearman’s rho) gives a similar pattern as 
in the case of Pearson’s correlation, but the correlations are stronger. Especially the 
correlation between the referee’s judgment and the amount of money received is 
moderately strong now. (table 13) 
 
 
TABLE 13: Success by past performance and peer review 
  cit referee  euro 
Publications Spearman’s rho .923(**) -.205(**) .160(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
  N 1186 1178 1186
Citations Spearman’s rho  -.214(**) .185(**)
    Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000
    N  1178 1186
Referee  Spearman’s rho   -.455(**)
    Sig. (2-tailed)   .000
    N   1178
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
Can we predict success using the independent variables? Again, we use Discriminant 
Analysis (DA) and also include the variable results of the referee process in the analysis. 
The outcome of the DA is much better now (table 14 versus table 8), as the percentage 
correctly classified successful applications increases to 85%. The number of correctly 
classified unsuccessful ones is now slightly lower at 61%. A stepwise procedure does 
not change the result – but the ‘pub’ variable is removed again. 
 
 
TABLE 14: Classification of applications from pub, cit, and ref (all, stepwise*) 
 
A versus 
A- / B  
Predicted Group  
Membership Total 
    A A- or B   
Original Count A 231 43 274
    A- or B 354 550 904
  % A 84.3 15.7 100.0
    A- or B 39.2 60.8 100.0
a 66.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
* Stepwise: cit and ref in the analysis 
 
 
All the discriminant analyses result in a significant model. Can we predict the success of 
applicants from their publications, citations, and referee scores? The referees’ 
judgments contribute much to the correct classification. Also, the relation between 
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money received and the referee’s judgments is moderately high at 0.46. Nevertheless, 
this implies that still a large part of the variance remains unexplained. Is this related to 
the dispersion of the reviewers’ judgments?  
Figures 7, 8, and 9 do suggest this. They plot the variance of the reviews of a proposal 
against the average score of the referees. Apart from a few high scoring applications, 
the variance indeed is large in most of the cases.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 9: Variance by average referees’ score - the funded proposals (A) 
  
 
FIGURE 10: Variance by average referees’ score– fundable non-funded (A-)  
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FIGURE 11: Variance by average referees’ score– not-fundable (B)  
 
 
Additionally, the scatter plots are rather similar: so we have high scoring (average 
between 1 and 1.5) applications with low variance (between 0 and 1) in all three 
categories: the funded (A), fundable non-funded (A-) and non-fundable (B). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10: Distribution of average referees’ score (black line); successful applicants (left) and 
unsuccessful (right). Grey (in color: green) line: number of reviews* 
(*: The large variation in the number of reviews is partly due to the different procedures in programs under study. In some 
cases the procedure includes a pre-selection, resulting in a higher number of reviews) 
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Next, we compare the scores received from the reviewers visually (in figure 12). The 
successful applicants seem to do better than the unsuccessful ones. The number of 
applications receiving a “1” is relatively larger in the left part of the graph than in the 
right, and the opposite is true for the referee results between “2” and “5”. 
However, when we compared the 275 successful applications with the 275 best 
reviewed unsuccessful applications we found that there is hardly any difference between 
the average referee sores of the two groups (fig 11). Note that this group of best 
unsuccessful applicants is different from the one in previous sections, because the 
selection in this case is based on the referee scores and not on past performance. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 11: Average referees’ score; successful applicants (black line) and the 275 best scoring 
unsuccessful applications (dotted black line).  
 
 
A statistical analysis of the sample 275 successful and 275 best refereed unsuccessful 
applicants confirms this picture: ANOVA finds no differences between the two groups, no 
correlation exists between past performance, referee score, and funding received, and 
the DA does not work. In the DA, all variables are excluded from the analysis, indicating 
that publications, citations and referee score cannot be used to predict success. 
With these results, research questions 4 and 5 can be answered:  
? the funded applicants have on average a better referee’s score than the non-
funded applicants;  
? the fundable applicants have on average a better referee’s score than the non-
fundable; 
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? the funded applicants have on average a better referee’s score than the 
fundable-non-funded; 
? but the 275 unsuccessful applicants with the highest referee scores are at the 
same level as the successful applicants. 
? and within the group of 550 successful and best unsuccessful applicants, all 
relations disappear between past performance, referee score and success. 
In the rest of the report, some more detailed analysis will be presented:  
? Differences between disciplines: success rates, and the predictive power of past 
performance, network, and review results; 
? If we distinguish the different instruments (Veni, Vidi, Vici, Open competition), 
does this influence the results? 
? Gender bias? 
? Do universities perform differently (and what may explain this?) 
? Differences between years of application. 
? What about those who not apply?  
 
 
 
 
5.2 Disciplinary differences? 
Two issues need to be addressed here. First, do the various disciplines perform 
differently within the total set? And secondly, are the decisions on the discipline level 
stronger or weaker related to past performance and the referee’s judgment?  
Table 15 shows two interesting patterns. First, the accepted applications tend to be 
unevenly distributed over the disciplines. Three disciplines have a large share of all 
accepted proposals: psychology and pedagogy (43%), Economics (17%), and Law 
(14%). All the others together only get 26%. The acceptance rates differ between the 
sub-disciplines, from 10% in political science to 32% in psychology.  
Second, the distribution of successful applications over the disciplines reflects the size of 
the disciplines. The last column in table 15 gives some information about the size of the 
disciplines in the Netherlands universities, in terms of the number of full professors and 
associate professors. The differences in size are rather large. The number of professors 
per discipline correlates highly (r = 0.80) with the number of applications, and moderately 
high (r = 0.53) with the number of successful applications.  
‘Redistribution’ takes place between the large disciplines. Economics and law get 
substantially less than expected given their size. Psychology gets much more: 15% of 
the senior staff produces 29% of the applications, and 46% of the successful one’s. This 
is even stronger the case if we distinguish between the four instruments. The most 
striking point is that almost all Vici’s are for researchers in the field of psychology (table 
16). 
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TABLE 15: Accepted applications by subfield (OC and VI) 
 
Number of 
 applications 
Applications 
by field Accepted 
Rejection 
 Rate 
Accepted  
by field 
 
Professors* 
Anthropology 30 2.4 9 70.0 3.3  2.3  
Communication  31 2.4 5 83.9 1.8  1.5  
Demography 10 0.8 2 80.0 0.7  0.1  
Economics** 301 23.7 46 84.7 16.8  35.6  
Education 81 6.4 14 82.7 5.1  3.3  
Geography 47 3.7 8 83.0 2.9  3.4  
Law 219 17.2 41 81.3 15.0  28.4  
Political science***  61 4.8 6 90.2 2.2  6.0  
Psychology**** 370 29.1 119 67.8 43.4  15.0  
Sociology 121 9.5 24 80.2 8.8  4.5  
Total 1271 100% 274 78.4 100%  100%  
*  Full and associate professors by field – based on EUR, RUG, RUN, UM, UU, UvA, UvT, and VU. Source: NOD, 
2004.  
**  Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy; ****  Incl. pedagogy 
 
 
TABLE 16: Accepted applications by subfield and instrument 
 Total Open Vici Vidi Veni 
Psychology* 119 65 41.9   9 75.0 18 42.9 27 41.5
Economics** 46 22 14.2 2 16.7 9 21.4 13 20.0
Law 41 31 20.0 4 9.5 6 9.2
Sociology 24 19 12.3 1 2.4 4 6.2
Education 14 2 1.3 2 4.8 10 15.4
Anthropology 9 5 3.2 3 7.1 1 1.5
Geography 8 3 1.9 1 8.3 3 7.1 1 1.5
Political science***  6 5 3.2 1 2.4
Communication  5 2 1.3 3 4.6
Demography 2 1 0.6 2.4 1
Total 274 155 100% 12 100% 42 100% 65 100%
* Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy  
 
 
Citation behavior and publication behavior differ between disciplines and fields. Figure 
12 shows the distribution of sociology and psychology journals by impact factor, and 
table 17 gives some statistics. Clearly, psychology journals have on average higher 
impact factors, and this indicates that psychologists have longer reference lists per 
paper than sociologist do. Also what counts as a top journal in psychology is different 
from what would count as top in sociology, if we take the impact factor of the journal (IF) 
as a criterion. The top 10% starts in sociology with an IF of 1.821, and in psychology 
with an IF of 3.11. 
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FIGURE 12: Journals in sociology and psychology by impact factor 
 
 
 
TABLE 17: Citation behavior by discipline 
 mean CoV* median max top 10% skewness N 
All SocSCI 0.982 1.041 0.697 12.642 IF >2.013 3.869 1745 
Psychology 1.287 1.386 0.650 9.780 IF >3.458 3.114 101 
Sociology 0.683 0.879 0.460 3.262 IF >1.382 1.982 94 
*: coefficient of variance = standard deviation divided by mean; IF = Impact Factor 
 
These differences on the discipline level are reflected in the scores on the variables 
used in this study. Indeed, the averages of the variables show a large variation between 
the disciplines (table 18). 
 
 
TABLE 18: Past performance, network quality and referee scores by discipline 
Mean: Pub# cit Pub2 Cit2 Pub3 Cit3 ref K€ N 
Anthropology 1.4 5.3 1.0 3.8 1.4 5.3 2.4 234 28 
Communication 3.7 16.1 2.8 11.4 4.1 18.7 2.6 149 30 
Demography 2.3 7.0 3.1 11.8 4.6 20.2 2.4 288 9 
Economics** 2.4 8.5 2.4 8.8 3.0 11.4 2.6 235 274 
Education 2.8 19.7 2.9 20.1 3.3 21.9 2.8 180 79 
Geography 2.5 12.0 2.6 12.4 2.9 13.4 2.2 340 40 
Law 0.5 2.0 0.6 2.4 1.0 3.8 2.3 187 206 
Political sci*** 1.2 3.8 1.2 4.0 1.6 5.9 2.5 209 56 
Psychology* 5.8 48.5 5.9 49.7 7.8 65.3 2.2 249 347 
Sociology 2.9 13.3 3.4 17.3 4.9 26.2 2.5 169 115 
Total 3.1 20.3 3.2 21.1 4.2 27.9 2.4 226 1184 
# See table 1 for the variable names; * Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy 
 
 
To find out whether these differences between disciplines influence the results of 
sections 5 and 6, we repeated the analysis also for the different disciplines individually. 
Table 19 shows the correlations between past performance, referee results and the 
amount of funding for the whole set, and for the disciplines individually.  
TABLE 19: Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between performance,  
journal by impact factor
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0.7 1.3 2.0 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.7 7.3 8.0 8.7 9.3 10.0
Sociology (Mean = 0.68 / N=94)
Psychology (Mean = 1.29 / N=101)
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referees’ score and received grant by discipline  
 PP~Rev PP~€ Rev~€ N 
All 0.21 0.17 0.46 1181 
Average 0.28 0.28 0.44  
Psychology* 0.27 0.19 0.49 345 
Economics** 0.33 0.15 0.42 274 
Law - - 0.43 206 
Sociology 0.17 - 0.45 114 
Education 0.32 0.10 0.43 79 
Political science*** 0.27 - - 56 
Geography 0.36 0.44 0.37 40 
Communication - 0.28 0.50 30 
Anthropology 0.27 0.50 0.45 28 
Demography - - - 9 
PP = past performance (average of variables pub and cit) 
Netw = quality of the network (average of variables pub3 and cit3) 
Rev = average of the referee scores (variable ref) 
€ = amount of money received (variable euro) 
* Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy 
 
If the selected past performance indicators are valid, table 19 shows that on average 
these bibliometric indicators work better on the discipline level, as the correlations 
between these past performance indicators and the outcome of the refereeing process 
are slightly better here than on the more aggregated level. The same holds for the 
correlation between past performance and funding received. However, the correlations 
are still not high. The relation between the review outcome and the received funding 
remains unchanged. However, a few cases deviate from this pattern: 
? In the case of law, the bibliometric indicators do not correlate at all with the review 
results and with the received funding. This is in line with the opinion that research in 
the field of law is not oriented at international journals but has other types of (mainly 
national oriented) output;  
? In the case of political science, the quality indicators do not correlate with the amount 
of funding; 
? In the case of communication, the bibliometric indicators do not correlate with the 
referees’ evaluation; 
? In the case of demography, negative correlations were found, but are not significant, 
due to the low N.  
If we go to a more detailed level, the analysis generally does not improve. As an 
example, we calculated the correlations between past performance, the referee 
outcomes and the success of the application for the four sub-disciplines of psychology, 
as distinguished by the research council. Some of the correlation are higher than for 
psychology on average, others are very low and/or not significant (table 20).  
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TABLE 20: Correlations (Spearman’s rho) between performance, referees’ score and received grant by 
sub-discipline (psychology) 
 PP~Rev PP~€ Rev~€ N 
All 0.21 0.17 0.46 1181 
Psychology (incl ped.) 0.27 0.19 0.49 345 
Clinical /biological /medical psychology 0.32 0.45 85 
Developmental psychology & pedagogy 0.25 0.35 0.49 68 
Cognitive and biological psychology 0.28 0.49 109 
Social, work, organizational psychology; psychometrics 0.24 0.29 0.58 83 
 
 
Finally, we used Discriminant Analysis at the level of disciplines. If we only use the past 
performance indicators in the analysis, the results on discipline level are similar to those 
for the whole set, with the exception of law (83% correct positives, 15% correct 
negatives). But we already saw that the indicators do not seem to work in the case of 
law (table 19). Interestingly, if we use all the variables in a stepwise analysis, only the 
peer review variable (ref) is used, and the past performance indicators are removed from 
the analysis.  
We now can answer question 6: the indicators work slightly better on discipline level, but 
this does not change the results obtained in the previous sections on the level of all 
disciplines together.10  
 
 
5.3 Differences between funding instruments? 
A main difference exists between the instruments: the Open Competition is, as the name 
suggests, open to all (teams of) senior researchers, whereas the other three programs 
are intended for individual researchers at different (early) stages of their career. The 
Veni program is for postdocs, the Vidi is for assistance of young associate professors, 
and the Vici is for already established but relatively young researchers who are or could 
become full professor.  
The criteria and the selection procedure are different. In case of the open competition, 
the emphasis is on the quality of the proposal. In case of the Veni, Vidi, and Vici 
program, the individual researcher him/herself is also assessed. This would imply that in 
the case of an open competition, the refereeing part of the procedure is expected to be 
stronger than the past performance. These may be more important in the other three 
programs; however, the Veni program is meant for young researchers, without much 
past performance. Consequently, we would expect that the correlation between past 
performance and successful applications is lower in the open competition and in the 
                                                 
10 If we compare the successful applicants with the best unsuccessful applicants, also on the discipline 
level the differences disappear. Using Anova, in each of the disciplines the referee scores, the number 
of publications and the citations received do not significantly differ between the succesfull and the best 
unsuccessful applicants. 
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Veni program, whereas the relation between the referee’s judgment is expected to be 
stronger in these two cases. 
Figure 21 shows the averages quality indicators by instrument. The Vici applicants are 
on average far more productive (publications) and visible (citations) than the others. The 
next highest group is the applications in the Open Completion, followed by the Vidi 
applicants, and the Veni applicants.  
We repeated the analysis for the four programs separately, with the following results. 
The differences between the successful and unsuccessful applicants in the two larger 
programs (the Open Competition and the Veni program) are similar to the general 
picture of section 5 and 6. However, in case of the Vidi and Vici programs, this is not the 
case. The average number of publications and citations is larger in the successful group 
than in the unsuccessful one, but the dispersion is large (and the number of cases 
small), making the difference between the means not significant. However, differences in 
the referees’ judgments are substantial and significant (table 21). 
 
 
TABLE 21: Average quality of applicants by instrument 
 Vici OC Vidi Veni 
Publications 9.8 3.8 3.0 1.7 
A    9.7 5.0 3.6 2.9 
A- 6.3 3.2 1.9 1.9 
B 10.7 3.7 3.1 1.4 
A- and B  9.9 3.4 2.6 1.5 
Citations 89 25 20 10 
A 112 39 25 21 
A- 36 20 7 11 
B 81 20 20 7 
A- and B 73 20 15 8 
Referee score 1.70 2.10 2.30 2.98 
A 1.13 1.42 2.01 1.79 
A- 1.45 1.92 2.53 2.31 
B 2.06 2.69 2.51 2.32 
A- and B 1.75 2.33 2.52 3.19 
N 29 629 100 428 
A 12 155 43 65 
A- 3 224 20 46 
B 14 250 37 317 
A- and B 17 479 57 363 
 
 
This is reflected in the correlation analysis (table 22). Contrary to the expectation 
formulated in the introduction to this section, the relationship between past performance 
and the referee result is moderately strong in the Vidi program, and in all the three other 
programs this correlation is small and non-significant. The same holds for the correlation 
between past performance and the research funding. The correlation between the result 
of the referee process and the funding awarded is the higher in the Veni program than in 
the open program and in Vidi. However, it is very high in case of the Vici program. 
Summarizing, past performance makes hardly any difference in the various programs, 
and in all but the Veni program the correlation is very low. This is actually unexpected, 
as especially in case of the Veni program for the youngest group of researchers one 
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would not expect past performance, but promise of future performance to be dominant. 
Peer review is in all programs the main factor, and the correlation is especially strong in 
case of the Vici program. 
 
 
TABLE 22: Correlation between quality and grant received by instrument 
 PP~Rev PP~€ Rev~€ N 
All 0.21 0.17 0.46 1181 
Open program 0.10 0.07 0.44 623 
Veni 0.31 0.19 0.49 426 
Vidi 0.12* 0.10* 0.41 100 
Vici 0.04* 0.17* 0.70 29 
pp = past performance (average of variables pub and cit) 
Netw = quality of the network (average of variables pub3 and cit3) 
Rev = average of the referee scores (variable ref) 
€ = amount of money received (variable euro) 
* = non significant 
 
 
The Discriminant Analysis provides us with similar results. The DA is not able to 
distinguish the A and A- applications. And, in case of Vidi and Vici, the DA only uses the 
referees’ outcome and not past performance, when classifying A versus A-/B. The 
classification is rather good, especially in case of the Vici’s: 86.2% correctly classified 
cases.  
Again we compare the successful applications with the best scoring unsuccessful ones. 
Here we do this per instrument, by including the best scoring rejected applications, 154, 
65, 43 and 12 for the OC, Veni, Vidi and Vici respectively. In case of the open 
competition, no differences exist between the successful and top-unsuccessful 
applications. In case of the Veni program, the successful applicants publish on average 
more than the unsuccessful applicants. In the other two programs, the referee score of 
the successful one’s is on average better than the scores of the unsuccessful 
applications. The correlation analysis shows the same, as table 23 shows.  
 
 
TABLE 23: Correlation between quality and grant received by instrument (550 cases) 
 PP~Rev PP~euro Rev~euro N 
All 0.03* 0.07* 0.07* 550 
Open program - 0.09* - 0.01* 0.00* 304 
Veni 0.22 0.13* 0.05* 132 
Vidi .0.05* 0.10* 0.31 88 
Vici 0.06* 0.17* 0.65 24 
pp = past performance (average of variables pub and cit) 
Rev = average of the referee scores (variable ref) 
euro = amount of money received (variable euro) 
* = non significant 
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The results of the Discriminant Analysis are similar11. In case of the OC, the classification 
is worse than a random classification; in case of the Veni program, the about half of the 
successful and half of the unsuccessful applications are classified correctly. As the prior 
probabilities in this sample are also 50%, the past performance variables and the referee 
variable do not improve the classification. In the two other programs (Vidi and Vici), 
especially the referee variable leads to a correct classification of about 70 to 80 % of the 
cases. 
If we draw a conclusion on the level of the individual instruments, success is not or 
hardly related to past performance (table 22 and 23). Success correlates with referee 
judgments, but if we restrict the analysis to the best 550 applicants, this is not the case 
anymore in the OC and the Veni program. Finally, on the level of the individual 
programs, reviews and past performance hardly correlate, and only for the Veni program 
correlation between past performance and review score is moderately strong.  
 
 
TABLE 23: Classification by instrument (550 cases) 
   Predicted Group 
Membership 
Instrument  Funded 1 2 Total
OC* Original Count Yes 61 92 153
      No 78 73 151
    % Yes 39.9 60.1 100.0
      No 51.7 48.3 100.0
Veni** Original Count Yes 30 37 67
      No 27 37 64
    % Yes 44.8 55.2 100.0
      No 42.2 57.8 100.0
Vidi*** Original Count Yes 28 16 44
      No 12 31 43
    % Yes 63.6 36.4 100.0
      No 27.9 72.1 100.0
Vici**** Original Count Yes 10 2 12
      No 2 10 12
    % Yes 83.3 16.7 100.0
      No 16.7 83.3 100.0
* 44.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
** 51.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
*** 67.8% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
**** 83.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
 
 
5.4 Gender differences 
 
In the available dataset, 32% of all applications have a female principle investigator, 
unevenly distributed over the  disciplines. Relatively more female than male applicants 
are found in anthropology, psychology and education. The opposite is the case in 
economics (table 25).  
                                                 
11 The stepwise procedure does not work in case of the OC.  
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FIGURE 25: Gender of applicants by discipline  
 Male Female Total 
Anthropology 11 1.4% 17 4.5% 28 2.4%
Communication 18 2.2% 12 3.2% 30 2.5%
Demography 4 .5% 5 1.3% 9 .8%
Economics** 225 27.8% 49 13.0% 274 23.1%
Education 30 3.7% 49 13.0% 79 6.7%
Geography 35 4.3% 5 1.3% 40 3.4%
Law 144 17.8% 62 16.4% 206 17.4%
Political sci*** 44 5.4% 12 3.2% 56 4.7%
Psychology* 219 27.1% 128 33.9% 347 29.3%
Sociology 78 9.7% 39 10.3% 117 9.9%
 Total 808 100% 378 100% 1186 100%
* Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy 
 
 
Of the funded applications, 29% have a female applicant. Some 27% of the A- 
applications are from female researchers, and a little more than 35% of the B 
applications. As far as successful applications are concerned, women are as successful 
as men in law and psychology, but much less in economics, anthropology, 
communication, sociology and political science (table 26). Here, we can only speculate 
why this is the case. 
We also find differences between the funding instruments and between disciplines. 
Women are more successful than men in the open competition and in the Vidi program, 
but less successful in the Veni and Vici  programs.  
 
 
TABLE 26: Success by gender and discipline 
  male Female  male Female 
Anthropology A 55% 17% Geography 20% 20% 
 A- 9% 35%  31% 20% 
 B 36% 47%  49% 60% 
 N 11 17  35 5 
Communication A 22% 8% Law 20% 19% 
 A- 22% 17%  30% 39% 
 B 56% 75%  50% 42% 
 N 18 12  144 62 
Demography A 25% 20% Political science 11% 8% 
 A- 25% 60%  23% 17% 
 B 50% 20%  66% 75% 
 N 4 5  44 12 
Economics A 19% 8% Psychology 34% 34% 
 A- 26% 14%  26% 16% 
 B 56% 78%  40% 49% 
 N 225 49  219 128 
Education A 20% 16% Sociology 24% 15% 
 A- 20% 8%  32% 21% 
 B 60% 76%  44% 64% 
 N 30 49  78 39 
 
Rathenau Instituut – Department of Science System Assessment 
 
37
As gender inequality is increasingly becoming a policy issue, are differences between 
men and women changing?  We do not have a long time series, but only three years of 
observation (table 27).Real trends are not particularly observable. Nevertheless, in 2005 
the picture differs from the earlier years.  In 2005, some 60% of as well the male as the 
female applicants is in the B category. And a larger percentage of women (24%) is 
successful in 2005 than male researchers (20%). 
 
 
TABLE 27: Success by gender 
  Male Female Total 
 2003 26 21 25 
A  2004 25 19 23 
 2005 20 24 21 
     
 2003 24 15 21 
A- 2004 36 30 34 
 2005 19 15 18 
     
 2003 50 36 46 
A + A- 2004 61 49 57 
 2005 40 39 39 
     
 2003 50 64 54 
B 2004 39 51 43 
 2005 60 61 61 
     
 2003 272 99 371 
Total 2004 288 144 432 
 2005 248 135 383 
 
 
 
Gender bias? 
The question of gender bias in (peer) review procedures is an important issue 
(Wenneras & Wold 1997). Empirical research shows that there are contradictory 
findings, although a recent meta-analysis suggests that (small) gender bias does exist 
(Bornmann et al, forthcoming).  
Here, we define gender inequality as men having a better chance to get a project funded 
than women with the same referee result and with the same past performance.  For 
example, if male researchers have a better past performance, this may explain the 
higher rating by the referee’s and it may explain a higher success rate of male 
researchers. Table 25 shows that male and female researchers indeed do differ 
significantly in terms of publications, citations, and referee results. Male researchers get 
higher referee scores. The average score of female researchers is 87% of the score of 
male researchers (table 28). Female researchers also have lower past performance 
(about two third) than male researchers have.  
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If we distinguish between three groups of A, A- and B applications, the picture becomes 
slightly different. In all cases, male researchers score better. But for the A and A- 
applications, the difference between the number of citations for male and for female 
researchers’ is not any more significant. As table 28 shows, male and female 
researchers actually receive about the same number of citations in the A and A- group. 
The differences between the number of publications and between the refereeing results 
remain significant (at 10%). In the B category, differences between male and female 
researchers are significant.  
 
 
TABLE 28: Applications by gender 
 
Average nr of 
publications 
Average nr of 
citations 
Average referee 
score N 
Male 3.52 23 2.32 808  (68.1%) 
Female  2.24 16 2.66 378  (31.9%) 
Female / male  .64 .69 .87  
     
Male A 4.70 37 1.55 194  (70.5%) 
Female A 3.84 34 1.71 81  (29.5%) 
Female / male .82 .92 .91  
     
Male A- 3.24 18 1.98 215  (73.4%) 
Female A- 1.99 16 2.15 78  (26.6%) 
Female / male .58 .89 .92  
     
Male B 3.10 18 2.87 399  (64.6%) 
Female B 1.73 9 3.20 219  (35.4%) 
Female / male .56 .50 .90  
 
 
Does the selection process of the research council shows a gender bias?  
- First, based on the findings in table 28, female researchers are not disadvantaged in 
the refereeing process because the gender difference is smaller than it is in past 
performance.12 
- Second, cross tabs show a significant correlation between gender and the decision 
about the application (A, A-, B). Significantly more applications by women get the 
verdict ’not fundable’ than applications by men (49% for men versus 58% for 
women). However, within the set of fundable (A & A-) projects, 47% of the men and 
51% if the women get funded. This difference is not statistically significant. So in the 
higher categories, no significant gender difference is found. 
- Finally, we calculated the share of female researchers in the 275 best reviewed 
applications, in the set of 275 most publishing applicants and in the set of 275 most 
cited applicants (table 29). In all the three ‘top lists’ the share of female researchers 
is smaller than the share of women in the set of successful applicants.  
                                                 
12 The correlations between past performance and referee result are low but similar for men and 
women. And, the relative (to men) referee results for women are not lower than the relative past 
performance scores (table 27). This suggests that women do not get lower referee scores than men 
with similar past performance.  
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TABLE 29: Gender bias? 
 Male Female % Female 
Successful 275 applicants 194 81 29.5% 
Top 275 refereed applications 211 64 23.3% 
Top 275 publishing applicants 218 57 20.7% 
Top 275 cited applicants 211 64 23.3% 
 
 
Overall, this shows that the final decision-making corrects in favor of female applicants – 
reflecting a policy of stimulating women to go for research careers.  
 
 
 
5.5 Differences between universities 
In this section we give only the distribution of successful applications by university and 
by instrument.  Here, the differences are considerable. Of course, the differences may 
reflect size of the social, behavioral, economics and law faculties in the various 
universities. It also may reflect the different sizes of the subfields within the universities: 
a large psychology faculty is helpful as almost 50% of the successful applications is in 
psychology. 
 
 
TABLE 30: Successful applications by instrument and university 
 Total OC Vici Vidi Veni 
UvA 42 15.3% 18 11.6% 4 33.3% 6 14.0% 14 21.5% 
UvT 40 14.5% 26 16.8% 1 8.3% 6 14.0% 7 10.8% 
RUN 33 12.0% 20 12.9% 1 8.3% 6 14.0% 6 9.2% 
UU 31 11.3% 15 9.7% 2 16.7% 2 4.7% 12 18.5% 
UM 26 9.5% 17 11.0% 2 16.7% 2 4.7% 5 7.7% 
VU 25 9.1% 13 8.4% 0 .0% 5 11.6% 7 10.8% 
UL 22 8.0% 14 9.0% 0 .0% 4 9.3% 4 6.2% 
RUG 21 7.6% 13 8.4% 0 .0% 6 14.0% 2 3.1% 
EUR 9 3.3% 4 2.6% 0 .0% 1 2.3% 4 6.2% 
WUR 7 2.5% 5 3.2% 0 .0% 2 4.7% 0 .0% 
TUD 2 .7% 1 .6% 0 .0% 1 2.3% 0 .0% 
TUE 2 .7% 2 1.3% 0 .0% 9 .0% 0 .0% 
UT 3 1.1% 2 1.3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 1.5% 
Other 12 4.4% 5 3.2% 2 16.7% 2 4.7% 3 4.6% 
 275 100% 155 100% 12 100% 43 100% 65 100% 
 
 
 
5.6  Network effects: the co-applicants 
Another issue we explore here is the effect of the network of the main applicant. As 
argued above, we take co-applicants as a proxy for the network. Only open competition 
applications are included in the analysis, as the VI programs almost always have only 
one applicant.  
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Within the open competition applications, 51% of the applications have two applicants, 
and 21% of the applications have three or more. This means that only 28% of the 
applications have only one applicant. Does the past performance of the co-applicants 
play a role in the success of an application? The results of the analysis are as follows: 
- The network quality as defined is section 3 is significantly better for the A than for 
the A- applications, and the latter are again better than the B applications. 
- Correlation between the network indicators and the referee outcome is low to 
moderate, but higher than the correlation between the past performance and the 
result of the refereeing process.  
- The same holds for the correlation between network indicators and the amount of 
funding.  
- Including the network indicators in the Discriminant Analysis hardly improves the 
classification. 
We may therefore conclude that the quality of the co-applicants does positively influence 
the success of an application, but the effect is not very strong. 
 
  
TABLE 31: Network effects (Spearman's rho) 
 average score referees money received
Publications main applicant .077  .103 (**)
Network:    
    Average publications all (co-)applicants .089  (*) .143 (**)
    Publications most productive (co-)applicant .076  .149 (**)
    
Citations main applicant .113  (**) .133 (**)
Network:    
   Average nr citations all (co-)applicants .127  (**) .165 (**)
   Citations most visible (co-)applicant .124  (**) .168 (**)
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
N = 623 (open competition only) 
 
 
 
 
5.7  Differences between accepted, rejected and non-
applicants (vintage 2003) 
As the council’s goal is to fund better researchers, one would expect that in the clientele 
of the council the better researchers are over-represented. In this section, we test 
whether the applicants differ from the non-applicants in terms of past performance.  
We ran an ANOVA to test statistically whether the recipients score higher in terms of 
output and citations than the researchers that did not get their proposal accepted, and 
researchers who did not apply. This analysis is done for 2003 only, as an initial test 
which includes the non-applicants.  
The three groups score differently in terms of the average numbers of publications and 
received citations (table 32). The successful applicants publish more than the failed 
applicants and the non-applicants) (4.37 versus 2.87 versus 1.99 publications) and are 
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more cited (47 versus 21 versus 20 citations). A post hoc test (Scheffe) shows that the 
differences between group 1 and 2, and between group 1 and 3 are statistically 
significant, but the difference between group 2 and 3 is not. 
 
 
TABLE 32: Average number of publications and citations by group 
   
 
  
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean   
  N Mean 
Std.  
Dev 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Minimum Maximum
PUB 1 93 4.37 5.628 .584 3.21 5.52 0 29
  2 302 2.87 5.389 .310 2.26 3.48 0 62
  3 11761 1.99 2.663 .025 1.95 2.04 1 65
  Total 12156 2.03 2.807 .025 1.98 2.08 0 65
CIT 1 93 47.27 84.767 8.790 29.81 64.73 0 593
  2 302 20.97 54.560 3.140 14.80 27.15 0 524
  3 11761 20.14 45.891 .423 19.31 20.97 0 1115
  Total 12156 20.37 46.596 .423 19.54 21.20 0 1115
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Pub Between Groups 735.692 2 367.846 47.034 .000
  Within Groups 95047.140 12153 7.821   
  Total 95782.832 12155    
Cit Between Groups 68020.805 2 34010.402 15.702 .000
  Within Groups 26323315.863 12153 2165.993   
  Total 26391336.668 12155    
(1 = successful applicants; 2 = failed applicants; 3 = non applicants) 
 
 
Did the researchers with a higher performance also receive more funding in 2003? To 
answer this question, we correlated the variables ‘publications’ and ‘citations’ with the 
variable ‘euro received’. Publications are correlated marginally more than citations with 
obtaining grants, but the Pearson correlation coefficients are barely larger than zero.13 
All correlations are significant because of the large N. The high correlation between 
publications and citations was expected. 
 
 
TABLE 33: Pearson correlation between publications, citations,  
     and received funding –  including non-applicants 
 Cit euro 
Pub Pearson Correlation .730(**) .071(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 12156 12156
Cit Pearson Correlation .049(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000
  N 12156
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
                                                 
13 Excluding the applicants without ISI publications from the analysis does not influence the results. 
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Again, the distribution of the data (citations, publications) is rather skewed; therefore a 
rank order correlation is preferred. If we use a correlation measure for ordinal data 
(Spearman’s rho), the correlations between publications and citations with grants 
received is even smaller.  
 
 
TABLE 34: Correlation (rho) between publications, citations,  
   and received funding – including non-applicants 
 Cit euro 
Pub Spearman’s rho .541(**) .032(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 12156 12156
Cit Spearman’s rho .017
  Sig. (2-tailed) .064
  N 12156
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
  
If one accepts the definition of quality in terms of these indicators, then an interesting 
question is the extent to which the quality of the researcher predicts whether or not 
he/she gets a proposal accepted. Using Discriminant Analysis, we used the variables 
pub and cit as predictors for group membership: success, failure, or non-applicant. Only 
in one third of the cases, could the successful applicants be predicted, and only in 20% 
the rejected applications. The correct predictions are overshadowed by the size of Group 
3 (the non-applicants).  
In summary, applicants perform on average better than the others (i.e., rejected and 
non-applicants). But the predictive value of past performance is rather low, and 
correlation between past performance and receiving research money is low. If we restrict 
ourselves to the top 275 non applicants, as we have done in the other analyses shown in 
this report, this may again give an opposite result. 
 
 
TABLE 35: Classification results – three groups (a)  
  Predicted Group Membership Total 
 Group (b) 1 2 3   
Count 1 31 19 43 93
  2 62 59 181 302
  3 1016 1820 8925 11761
% 1 33.3 20.4 46.2 100.0
  2 20.5 19.5 59.9 100.0
  3 8.6 15.5 75.9 100.0
a. 72.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
b. 1 = successful applicants; 2 = failed applicants; 3 = non-applicants 
 
TABLE 36: Classification results – Wilks’ Lambda 
Test of Function(s) 
Wilks' 
Lambda Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 through 2 .990 121.862 4 .000
2 .999 15.251 1 .000
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6 Conclusion and discussion 
6.1 Conclusions 
The selected performance indicators:  
? Publications can be considered an indicator of productivity; citations as an 
indicator of diffusion. In this study, citations (“visibility”, “diffusion”) were shown to 
be a somewhat better indicator than publications (“productivity”) for predicting 
success in the case of a grant application. Differentiation among the disciplines 
did not change the results of the analysis; 
? The successful applicants are not so much more productive, but on average, are 
more visible (cited) than the failed applicants. Stepwise analysis removes the 
variable “publications” from the Discriminant Analysis (DA); 
? The number of “false positives” is (much) larger than the number of “false 
negatives”. This means that the system is more successful in declining 
applications than awarding them. At most, one third of the awards are positively 
indicated by these measures of past performance.  
? The definition of past performance takes into account only a part of the research 
output. E.g., books and book chapters are not included, although they are 
important in some of the disciplines considered. However, the conclusions 
remain valid when the analysis is restricted to disciplines where international 
journals are the dominant form of output. 
Peer review: 
? The outcome of the peer review is a stronger predictor of application success. It 
correlates low with past performance indicators, but much higher with the funding 
received. However the correlation is less than 0.5, which leaves much of the 
variance unexplained. In other words, the discretional power of the council is 
large. Peer review can be considered as part of the external organization of the 
council;  
? In the classification of successful and unsuccessful applications, the peer review 
result remains in the analysis with the citations received, whereas the number of 
publications is removed from the stepwise analysis. About 85% of the positives 
and about 65% of the negatives are in this case correctly classified;  
? We found a large variation in number of reviews, and the approved applications 
have on average more reviews than those that were not-approved: “A 
applications” got on average 2.9 reviews, ‘A- applications’ on average 2.6 and ‘B 
applications’ got on average 2.2 reviews. This raises questions with respect to 
the procedures; however these differences are due in part to the preselection 
phase in some of the programs. 
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Effect of the skewed distributions 
? The results change if we compare successful applications with a set of a similar 
size, consisting of the best of the rejected applications. Differences in past 
performance and in referee’s judgments disappear, or the relationships change 
their sign. Review scores and past performance are in this case negatively 
related to funding; 
? This suggests that equally good applications are currently not funded, and may 
be considered as a loss of talent.  
Differences between MaGW programs?  
? Differences were found between MAGW programs. On the level of the individual 
programs similar results were observed as those found for the whole set. 
? However, the picture changes here if we only include the best rejected 
applications.  The correlation between past performance and success 
disappears, but referee scores are correlated moderately to strongly with 
success. The relation between referee outcome and past performance also 
completely disappears;  
? In the OC, the quality of the proposal is expected to be the central criterion, and 
in the VI, the quality of the applicant. Our analysis does not support this. 
Differences between disciplines?  
? First, the distribution of funds over disciplines is proportional to the size of senior 
staff in various disciplines across the universities. The share of psychology (incl. 
pedagogy) in the awarded grants is much larger than one would expect on the 
basis of the size of the field. For economics and law, the opposite holds; 
? Second, at the discipline level the indicators work slightly better and the 
correlations are higher. This was expected. Peer review based indicators are 
more adequate on a low level of aggregation, and going from discipline to sub-
discipline only slightly improves the results. 
Gender differences? 
? Female researchers receive lower grades from the referees; 
? Female researchers also score lower on past performance indicators; 
? If we compare male and female researchers in the higher categories (A & A-), 
women still score lower than men on all variables, but the differences are 
relatively small and not significant; 
? Gender differences vary across the disciplines, and also across different 
instruments; 
? Over time, female researchers are becoming relatively more successful, and 
even relatively more successful than men. In 2005, 24% of the applications of 
women were successful, against 20% of male researchers;  
? Decision-making by the council is favorable for female researchers. 
Effect of quality of the network? 
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? The past performance of the co-applicants is positively related to success. The 
effect is not very strong.  
 
 
 
 
6.2 Open questions and policy implications 
This research leads to several open questions. Firstly, correlations between past 
performance and referee score’s are relatively low, so much of the variance is 
unexplained.  A low correlation between academic quality and the peer review outcome 
indicators, on the one side, and research funding, on the other, suggest that these 
factors are not used to support the decision-making processes. Further research on 
what happens during the decision-making process is needed, due to the fact that a 
(high) percentage of the variance remains unexplained. Other factors and criteria seem 
to dominate the decision-making process. Candidates for this may be the following: 
- the assessment (by the decision-making council) of which proposals are better or more 
doable, which ones focus on more relevant topics or fields, or which ones provide the 
promise of more scientific progress.  
- the discipline: the distribution of funds varies enormously among disciplines. Does this 
reflect quality? Is psychological research better than the research carried out in other 
fields? 
 
The peer review of the proposals is much more influential than the (also peer review 
based) bibliometric indicators, because it correlates much better with the funding 
received. Evaluation of the peer review process is therefore needed. The claim that 
distributing research grants through NWO leads to the selection of the best researchers 
needs further in-depth evaluation. Who are the reviewers, and how are they selected? 
And, could the nature of the network relations between applicants, co-applicants, 
reviewers and decision-makers explain success and failure? Comparison with other 
systems (NSF, DFG, for example) may be instructive. 
 
Other issues for further research: 
-  What about post performance? Do researchers funded by MaGW perform better ex 
post?  
-  This study covers only one research council. Extension to others would be useful. 
 
The following policy issues can be derived from this study: 
- The analysis shows that the difference between poor and good is easier to define, 
than it is between good and very good. This suggests that certain procedural 
changes may be useful.  Perhaps only a first round of rejecting poor applications is 
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needed, and then a light selection of the winners. Perhaps it is also useful to make a 
random selection from the set of good applications/applicants. 
- Indicators work slightly better at the disciplinary level than at the level of the social 
sciences in general. Since a quality comparison cannot be made on the higher 
MAGW level, does this imply that one should return to a more decentralized 
allocation mechanisms? 
On a more fundamental level the question emerges of whether the project selection 
mechanism is based on an unwarranted rationalist model: is it possible to pick the 
winners at the individual level?  The criteria and indicators are however, never 
unambiguous, and this holds for bibliometric indicators as well as for peer review.  
Perhaps the quality of project allocation is more a systems level issue. Instead of 
focusing on processes for selecting individual projects, we may have to ensure that the 
system works properly:   
? Quality requires variation and selection 
? Is variation supported? (by different funding institutions) 
? Is selection adequate? (a variety of criteria, open for innovation) 
? Are roles assigned adequately? 
? Is the system evaluated regularly? 
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